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Abstract—Deep learning-based person re-identification (Re-
ID) has made great progress and achieved high performance
recently. In this paper, we make the first attempt to examine the
vulnerability of current person Re-ID models against a dangerous
attack method, i.e., the universal adversarial perturbation (UAP)
attack, which has been shown to fool classification models with
a little overhead. We propose a more universal adversarial per-
turbation (MUAP) method for both image-agnostic and model-
insensitive person Re-ID attack. Firstly, we adopt a list-wise
attack objective function to disrupt the similarity ranking list
directly. Secondly, we propose a model-insensitive mechanism
for cross-model attack. Extensive experiments show that the
proposed attack approach achieves high attack performance and
outperforms other state of the arts by a large margin in cross-
model scenario. The results also demonstrate the vulnerability
of current Re-ID models to MUAP and further suggest the need
for designing more robust Re-ID models.
Index Terms—universal adversarial perturbation, cross-model
attack, list-wise attack, person Re-ID
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, deep learning-based person re-
identification (Re-ID) has made remarkable progress and
achieved high performance. Despite the great success, the vul-
nerability of neural networks has attracted increasing attention
in recent years. It is shown that the output of deep neural
networks can be easily attacked by a small perturbation on
the input [1]. After that, many methods have been proposed
to attack deep learning-based classification systems [2]–[5].
Classification attack can be accomplished by disturbing deci-
sion boundaries which separate the feature space of different
classes. However, it brings new, extra challenges to attack an
open-set, similarity-ranking problem like person Re-ID. In Re-
ID attack, there is no decision boundary in the feature space
and the entire similarity rank should be disordered.
There are a few works on the adversarial robustness with
respect to person Re-ID [6]–[10]. However, existing studies
on the vulnerability of Re-ID models under adversarial attack
faces two problems. Firstly, existing adversarial Re-ID attacks
are image-specific [6]–[10] and tailored adversarial samples
for Re-ID attacks have to be generated for every input image.
Secondly, current attack methods usually assume that the
adversarial perturbations are generated from and applied to
the same model [6], [7]. As a result, the attack performance
dramatically drops when perturbations are applied cross dif-
ferent models.
To mitigate the first problem, Universal Adversarial Per-
turbation (UAP) [4] is proposed to fool a given deep model
* Co-first authorship. † Corresponding author.
using a fixed perturbation map. It is shown that such an image-
agnostic approach can achieve high attack performance in
classification tasks [4], [5], [11], [12]. UAP is appealing as
it has several advantages over image-specific attack. First of
all, UAP is computationally efficient and easy to implement.
Once a UAP is trained, the attack can be performed by simply
adding the UAP to the input image without expensive online
optimization. Second, UAP is more dangerous to the person
Re-ID system since it does not require any prior on the
appearance of persons. Nonetheless, most of the existing UAP
methods focus on the closed-set classification tasks and few
of them are specifically designed for the person Re-ID tasks.
An effort is thus made in this study to bridge this gap.
For the second problem, it is clear that in a more realistic
scenario, this model-dependent problem should be addressed
to realize ‘more’ universal, model-insensitive attack. It is,
however, arduous to disentangle the perturbations from par-
ticular model structures, as a certain CNN model is usually
required to generate perturbations through the back propa-
gation algorithm. As a consequence, this problem remains
basically unsolved by the existing UAP attack methods. As
we will empirically show later in Section V-A, the cross-
model attack performance falls noticeably when the adversarial
samples are trained on a source model and used to attack
another target model with different CNN structures. Although
there are several attempts, such as the transferable attack [13]–
[15] or black-box attack [16]–[19] in the literature, they are
usually studied in an image-specific attack scenario solely and
the overall cross-model attack performance is still far from
satisfactory.
In this paper, we make the first attempt to address these
two problems jointly for person Re-ID attack. We propose
a more universal adversarial perturbation (MUAP) based
person Re-ID attack method, which is both image-agnostic
and model-insensitive. The MUAP method consists of two
key components: 1) a list-wise attack objective to directly
attack the global ranking list; and 2) a model-insensitive (MI)
regularization method to consolidate the attack transferability
against different model structures and domains. The proposed
method is demonstrated in Fig. 1. On the one hand, the list-
wise attack objective function aims at disrupting the entire rank
of feature similarity and directly decreasing the mean Average
Precision (mAP) performance for a Re-ID system. On the
other hand, the model-insensitive regularization rectifies the
model gradients to retain a natural image gradient distribution.
As a result, it counteracts the detrimental effect of particular
model structures on model-insensitive universal attack.
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2Fig. 1. The learning paradigm of the proposed method. Different colors in the ranking list and features stand for different IDs and a texture-rendered feature
vector indicates an attack. The model weights are fixed and only the perturbation is updated during optimization. The model-insensitive (MI) regularization
is applied on the perturbed image to directly rectify the gradients and constrain the perturbation.
We perform extensive experiments with five different CNN
architectures on two widely used Re-ID datasets to evaluate the
effects of the proposed method on list-wise attack and cross-
model cross-dataset attack. The results clearly show that the
proposed MUAP person Re-ID method achieves high attack
performance crossing different models and datasets. Besides,
we also investigate the performance of generalizing the UAP
methods from a zero-order constant form to a polynomial form
of UAP and obtain important results.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are manifold:
• We propose a more universal adversarial sample gen-
eration method for both image-agnostic and model-
insensitive person Re-ID attack.
• We devise an AP loss based list-wise attack objective
function to efficiently disrupt the entire rank list accord-
ing to the similarity between training samples.
• We propose a simple yet super-efficient model-insensitive
regularization term for universal attack against different
CNN structures.
II. RELATED WORK
Adversarial attack. Lots of methods have been proposed to
effectively attack the neural network based models [2], [3],
[20], [21]. One-step gradient-based method [1] is proposed
to generate adversarial samples by maximizing the networks
prediction error for one single step. I-FGSM [2] further
propose to update gradients iteratively. MI-FGSM [3] con-
siders the direction of previous optimization step and claims
better performance. These gradient-based methods generate
perturbations based on back-propagation gradients, but there
are cases where the target model parameters could not be
accessed. Since adversarial perturbations trained on one model
can usually fool other models [1], a typical way in this scenario
is to train perturbation on a source model and use it to attack
the target model, which is usually referred to as transfer attack
or black-box attack [13], [15]. Most of the attack methods are
image-specific. More recently, Moosavi t al. [4] showed the
existence of universal image-agnostic perturbations. Mopuri
et al. [5] propose a task-independent objective to train more
generalizable UAP.
The open-set tasks like person Re-ID are different from
the classification tasks in nature and thus it is infeasible to
straightforwardly apply existing attack methods against such
classification tasks to person Re-ID. Firstly, in classification
tasks, a decision boundary to distinguish different classes can
be formed within the feature space once a certain type of
classifiers is chosen. A classification attack is considered as a
success if the input polluted by the noise results in a wrong
label. In contrast, in Re-ID, there is no class boundary in the
feature space. As a result, a successful attack should disorder
the whole global ranking list, not just ruin the Top-1 results.
Secondly, in classification, once a model is learned, its output
is only determined by the input image. However, the output
of Re-ID, i.e., the ranking list returned by Re-ID system,
is determined by not only the input query image but also
the gallery set [22]. Therefore, the Re-ID attack brings new
challenges.
Adversarial attack against person Re-ID. There are a couple
of recent studies on adversarial attack against person Re-ID.
Bai et al. [6] propose an Adversarial Metric Attack (AMA)
method to generate adversarial gallery samples by maximizing
the distance between clean images and perturbed images.
Opposite-Direction Feature Attack (ODFA) is designed to
generate perturbations by pushing the perturbed images away
in the opposite direction of raw images in feature space [7].
In [8], query-specific perturbations are produced through an
unsupervised learning approach. Wang et al. [9] generate a
physical-world adversarial pattern on clothes for each person.
Wang et al. [10] propose to generate adversarial queries using
GAN-based network. Li et al. [22] propose retrieval-against
UAP (IR-UAP) which can be adapted to Re-ID attack.
This study is distinct from these existing ones about Re-ID
attack. Firstly, we focus on a difficult problem of producing
an image-agnostic, universal noise, while the existing methods
usually work on image-specific noises [6]–[9]. Secondly and
more importantly, we fulfill the more advanced requirement
of Re-ID UAP attack, i.e., the model-insensitive requirement,
while such a cumbersome requirement is usually out of the
scopes of the existing UAP attack [4], [13], [15], [17], [22]
and Re-ID attack studies [6]–[9]. The proposed regularization
3term is related to total variation [23] in form. Total variation
is previously used for image denoising, but here we introduce
it into the attack process to produce more transferable UAPs.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the proposed methods to generate
the more universal adversarial perturbation against Re-ID
models. We first give problem definition, and then intro-
duce the list-wise attack objective and the proposed model-
insensitive regularization method. We also explore the poly-
nomial form of UAPs.
A. Framework
Problem definition. Let D ⊂ Rm be a database of pedestrian
images, and fθ be a given Re-ID model, where θ denotes
model parameters, e.g., a CNN which embeds an image x ∈ D
to a feature vector space fθ(x) ∈ Rn. Typically, the model has
been trained with the objective that the distances of features
with the same person IDs (positive pairs) are smaller than
those with different IDs (negative pairs). The goal of UAP
attack is to seek a perturbation vector u with small magnitudes
that fools the model fθ so that for almost all query samples
in D, the negatives rank above the positives. We denote the
evaluation metric of Re-ID results as M . UAP attack against
Re-ID aims to find a vector u ∈ Rm which satisfies the
following constraints:
u = arg min
u
M, s.t.‖u‖γ ≤  (1)
where ‖·‖γ represents the `γ norm, and  limits the magnitude
of the perturbation vector u. As the gallery database is usually
quite large and not available in attack, we consider a more
practical situation where only the query image is attacked.
Baseline. We build the baseline for Re-ID attack by adopting
the iterative least likely class method [2], which is widely
used for attack against classification. The iterative least likely
class method tries to make the perturbed image q classified to
the least likely class yLL = arg miny{p(y|q)}. The objective
function to minimize is formulated as follows:
LBase = − log(p(yLL|q + u)). (2)
The classification-against attack methods consider single
images and ignore their relation. However, the relation be-
tween images, especially the relation between the query im-
ages and the gallery ones is fundamental and determines the
Re-ID results, i.e.the ranking list returned by Re-ID systems.
Therefore, instead of adopting the classification-against meth-
ods to Re-ID attack, we propose to attack the Re-ID system
by disrupting the entire similarity rank.
Overall Objective. The objective function of our method
is composed of a base list-wise attack objective for general
image-agnostic attack and a model-insensitive regularizer to
enhance cross-model attack performance. The list-wise objec-
tive aims at disrupting the entire rank of feature similarity.
And the model-insensitive regularizer aims to regularize the
perturbation during training to avoid overfitting and biasing
on the specific model. The overall objective is formulated as
follows:
L = LAP + λ · LMI , (3)
where LAP and LMI represent the attack objective and
the model-insensitive regularization respectively, and λ is a
parameter balancing this two terms.
B. List-wise Attack Objective
For a query person image q ∈ D, let q′ = q + u be the
attacked image, D+q and D−q be the positive and negative
gallery set with respect to q. Given a distance metric d(·, ·), let
Lq′ = (x1, x2, · · · , xl) be the ranking list w.r.t. q′ in D+q ∪D−q
in ascent order, i.e., d(fθ(q′), fθ(x1)) ≤ d(fθ(q′), fθ(x2)) ≤
· · · ≤ d(fθ(q′), fθ(xl)), where l = |D+q ∪D−q | is the length of
the list. The average precision (AP) of the ranking is defined by
the average of precision values evaluated at each rank position:
AP =
1
|D+q |
l∑
k=1
Pk · 1[xk ∈ D+q ], (4)
where 1[·] is the binary indicator function, | · | denotes
cardinality, and Pk denotes precision at the k-th position which
is formulated as:
Pk =
1
k
k∑
k′=1
1[xk′ ∈ D+q ], (5)
AP ∈ [0, 1] and the maximum value is achieved if and only if
every instance in D+q ranks above all instances in D−q . Finally,
mean average precision (mAP) accumulates AP in a dataset
and gives their average
mAP =
1
|D|
∑
q∈D
AP. (6)
Due to the sorting operation, AP is non-smooth and non-
differential. Thus it is difficult to optimize AP in neural
networks using the standard back-propagation training method.
Here we adopt the soft histogram approximation [24], where
the non-differential sorting operation is replaced by histogram
binning and soft indication. We assume the CNN embedding
fθ(·) is `2 normalized, and let d(fθ(q′), fθ(xi)) be the Eu-
clidean distance of CNN embeddings of the attacked query
and gallery image which lies in [0, 2]. Given a histogram bin
number b and equally divide the distance interval into b-1 parts
with length ∆ = 2b−1 . Similar to [24], [25], a soft indicator
function δ : R × {1, 2, · · · , b} → [0, 1] is defined, thus the
contribution of the each gallery instance xi to the k-th bin
(k ∈ [1, b]) is calculated by:
δ(xi, k) = max
(
1− ‖d(fθ(q
′), fθ(xi))− (k − 1)∆‖1
∆
, 0
)
,
(7)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the `1 norm. In this way, we can calculate
precision at each bin instead of at each rank position to avoid
the sorting operation. The precision at the k-th bin is:
Pˆk =
∑k
k′=1
∑l
i=1 δ(xi, k
′) · 1[xi ∈ D+q ]∑k
k′=1
∑l
i=1 δ(xi, k
′)
. (8)
4In an analogy to Eqs. 4 and 5, we can define the approxi-
mated average precision AˆP . Finally, we define our list-wise
loss function to minimize on top of AˆP as follows.
LAP = 1|D+q |
b∑
k=1
Pˆk ·
(
l∑
i=1
δ(xi, k) · 1[xi ∈ D+q ]
)
. (9)
The approximation method defined in Eqs. (8) and (9) do
not rely on the sorting operation, thus LAP can be optimized
in neural networks in an end-to-end manner to directly attack
the accuracy of person Re-ID.
C. Model-Insensitive Regularization
Transferability refers to the ability of a UAP trained on
a source model to attack a different target model. The
transferability of UAPs across different models and different
environments is important for person Re-ID attack in practice.
However, the transfer attack performance is usually much
lower than the white-box attack, which suggests the over-
fitting and bias of the UAP to the specific training model.
Since both Lbase and LAP depend on the CNN architecture
f and its parameter set θ, they are inevitably related to the
training model. To achieve the model insensitivity, we define
a regularization term that is independent of f and θ as follows:
LMI =
m∑
i=1
‖(∇q′)i‖pp =
m∑
i=1
(
‖(∂xq′)i‖pp + ‖(∂yq′)i‖pp
)
,
(10)
where q′ = q + u denotes the attacked image, ∇ denotes the
gradient operation, and ‖·‖p denotes the `p norm. The right
side of Eq 10 sums the gradients of the perturbed image with
respect to two directions and thus reflects the image gradient
energy. `p can be any forms of norm, we mainly consider the
`1 and `2 form in this paper.
The introduction of model-insensitive (MI) regularization
brings the following benefits. Firstly, it is clear that Eq. 10 is
model-insensitive as no information related to model structures
and parameter settings is used to define LMI . Secondly, min-
imizing LMI punishes the UAP with unusual pixel changes
and helps to avoid artifacts in the high-frequency part of the
attacked image. It helps to maintain the gradient distribution
of perturbed images as that of natural images, which not only
forces the perturbed image to appear natural, but also reduces
the risk of being interfered with other factors such as particular
model structures. Thirdly, minimizing LMI has the effect on
embedding the adversarial perturbations into pixels with high
image gradient magnitude.
Psychological studies have suggested that slight variations
of the pixels (e.g., caused by an adversarial signal with small
energy) become subtle if they are placed around contours. This
phenomenon is referred to as by the visual masking effect [26].
As a result, it significantly increases the difficulty to defend
against such unnoticeable adversarial signals.
We compare the perturbations trained with and without
LMI on single image in Fig. 2. (a)-(b) display two adversarial
perturbations for an input image (q) during training, without
(u1) and with (u2) LMI , (c)-(e) display the input and attacked
Algorithm 1 Learning More Universal Adversarial Perturba-
tions Against Person Re-Identification
Require: Database D, source model fθ, number of epochs T ,
`γ norm of perturbation bound , λ for balancing the LMI
term.
Ensure: The universal perturbation vector u, τ .
1: Initialize u← 0, τ ← 0,
2: while epochs ≤ T do
3: for each sample q ∈ D do
4: Update perturbation vector u using Eq. (12).
5: Update τ using Eq. (13) (only for polynomial UAP).
6: if u, τ get saturated then
7: Constrain perturbation vector u, τ using the pro-
jection defined in Eq. (14).
8: end if
9: end for
10: end while
(q + u1 and q + u2) images, and (f)-(g) display pixel values
(q) of a scan line, their gradients (∂xq), attacked pixel val-
ues (q + u1 and q + u2), and their gradients (∂x(q + u1)
and ∂x(q + u2)), respectively. As can be seen from (f)-(g),
compared to ∂x(q + u1), ∂x(q + u2) is closer to ∂xq so
that the attacked image is less noisy and more natural when
regularized by LMI . The final trained UAPs can be found in
Fig. 5. As defined in Eq. 10, LMI is applied on the input
image, and independent of both the CNN architecture f and
the distribution of its parameter θ. Consequently, LMI rectifies
q′ to reduce the risk of biasing u on the model fθ exclusively.
We show later that such a model-insensitive regularization can
significantly improve the performance of cross-model attack in
Section V. On the other hand, LMI may also be applied on
the perturbation u itself, and thus this term becomes data-
free. Nevertheless, in this way inherent structures in data is
neglected. Therefore, we enforce the LMI term to be coupled
with the input to explore characteristics of data for improving
the attack performance in this work. Experimental results in
Section V also show that our method generalizes well to
different datasets.
LMI is the gradient energy which statistically measures of
the complexity of an image with respect to its spatial variation.
We calculate average gradient energy of the original and
attacked images using u1 and u2 on two datasets, and present
the results in Fig. 3. As it can be seen, q + u1 can increase
the gradient energy remarkably, which makes them statistically
different from uncontaminated images, while q+u2 maintains
the same level as q with an additional perturbation noise. This
phenomenon indicates that the preservation of some statistical
character during attack may enhance the attack transferability
across models.
D. Exploration on Polynomial UAPs
Existing works on UAP mainly focus on the additive
perturbation signal which perturbs the images by adding a
single universal perturbation. In this paper, we also investigate
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Fig. 2. Comparison of perturbations trained with and without the model-insensitive regularization. (a)-(b): Two adversarial perturbations for an input
image during the training procedure, without (u1) and with (u2) regularization. Pixel values are amplified (10×) for visualization. (c)-(e): The input and two
attacked images. (f)-(g): Pixel values q for a channel of a scan line indicated in (c), gradient values ∂xq, attacked pixel values q + u1 and q + u2, and their
gradients ∂x(q + u1) and ∂x(q + u2).
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Fig. 3. Average gradient energy on two datasets, where q represents the
original image and u1 and u2 are the UAPs trained without and with the MI
regularization, respectively.
a more general, polynomial form of UAP. Instead of computing
a single additive signal, polynomial UAP is composed of both
an additive signal and a multiplicative signal. The introduction
of the multiplicative signal modulates the perturbation in
line with the images of interest. In this way, image-specific
information is introduced into ’universal’ attack, which should
enhance the attack performance with minor implementation
convenience. The polynomial UAP is formulated as follows:
q′ = q +
q
‖q‖2
 τ + u, (11)
where  represents Hadamard product, τ denotes the multi-
plicative signal and u denotes the additive perturbation. It is
clear from the formulation that the polynomial UAP degrades
into traditional zero-order form of UAP when τ is a zero
signal.
E. Optimization
Algorithm 1 summarizes the overall learning process. We
learn the perturbation vector iteratively in mini-batch. At the
t-th iteration, we compute LAP by treating each image in the
batch as the query image and others as gallery images. Then
the gradient of loss function with respect to the perturbation
∇uL is calculated using back-propagation. After that, we use
the stochastic gradient decent with momentum [3] to update
the perturbation as follows: gt ← η · gt−1 +
∇uL
‖∇uL‖1
ut ← ut−1 + α · sign(gt),
, (12)
where gt accumulates the gradients of the first t iterations
with a decay factor η, and α is the learning rate. Similarly,
for the polynomial UAP, the multiplicative signal τ is updated
as follows:  ρt ← η · ρt−1 +
∇τL
‖∇τL‖1
τt ← τt−1 + β · sign(ρt),
, (13)
Similar to [4], we define a projection operator to decrease the
perturbation if it gets saturated:
u← arg min
u′
‖u− u′‖p, s.t.‖u′‖p ≤  · (1− σ)
τ ← arg min
τ ′
‖τ − τ ′‖p, s.t.‖ q‖q‖2
 τ ′‖p ≤  · σ,
(14)
where σ controls the effect of the multiplicative term. If only
first-order polynomial UAP is considered, σ is set to zero.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we elaborate the evaluation metrics, the
datasets, and the experimental settings.
Evaluation metric. Following [22], we compute the mean
mAP Drop Rate (mDR) to evaluate the attack performance
quantitatively:
mDR(q, u) =
mAP (q)−mAP (q + u)
mAP (q)
, (15)
where mAP (q) denotes the mean average precision of q, and
u refers to our UAP vector. A positive mDR means the attack
is successful, and higher the value, better the attack.
Datasets. We perform experiments on three widely used
image-based Re-ID datasets and one video-based Re-ID
dataset, including Market-1501 [28], DukeMTMC-reID [29],
MSMT17 [30], and MARS [31]. Market-1501 contains 32668
pictures corresponding to 1501 identities. 12936 images are
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Fig. 4. Comparison with state-of-the-art attack methods. State-of-the-art methods work well in the white-box attack scenario, but degenerate significantly
in the black-box case where the proposed method outperforms the others by a large margin. We compare our proposed method with TCIAA [10], AMA [6],
ODFA [7], GD-UAP [5], IR-UAP [22], M-DI2-FGSM [27], MI-FGSM [3], and TAP [15]. (a) shows the attack performances in white-box scenario where
UAP is trained and tested on the same model employing the same dataset. (b-d) show performances in transfer attack or black-box attack scenario where
UAP is evaluated across CNN architectures or datasets. The asterisk (*) denotes methods that are adapted from original ones to the ‘universal’ setting.
used for training and the rest used for testing. DukeMTMC-
reID contains 36411 images of 1404 individuals, of which 702
identities are used for training and the rest 702 identities for
testing. MSMT17 contains 126441 images of 4101 identities.
32621 images of 1041 identities are used for training and
the rest used for testing. MARS is the largest video-based
Re-ID dataset with around 20000 tracklets corresponding to
1261 identities. For image-based Re-ID models, We perform
attack by adding UAP on query images and aim to cause lower
rank of gallery images corresponding to the same identity. For
video-based ones, we add UAP on every frame of the query
clips.
Implementation details. To evaluate the UAP transferabil-
ity to different CNN architectures, we train models with
five different backbones following the effective training
method proposed in BoT [32], including ResNet50 [33],
DenseNet121 [34], VGG16 [35], SENet154 [36], and Shuf-
fleNet [37]. We train UAP with 800 images randomly selected
from the corresponding training set. The input images are
resized to 256×128, and we set λ = 10, η = 0.4, the learning
rate α = 0.25, the maximum number of epochs T = 100, and
the training batchsize is set to 32. If not specified, `2 form
of MI regularization is adopted in this paper. For polynomial
UAP, we set σ = 0.1, β = 0.025.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we perform extensive experiments to validate
the effectiveness of our proposed method. 1) We compare the
attack performance of our proposed methods with eight state
of the arts in different scenarios for sufficient comparison.
As most of the methods are image-specific, we build the
baselines by adapting these methods [3], [6], [7], [10], [15],
[27] to the universal setting and compare our method with
them. 2) To further demonstrate the effectiveness of each
component of our method, we perform extensive ablation study
in various scenarios. 3) We evaluate the attack transferability
of UAP to models with different CNN architectures or to
different datasets. 4) We explore the polynomial form of UAP
attack. 5) We test different forms of the model-insensitive
regularization with `1 and `2 norm respectively.
A. Comparison with State of The Arts
We compare our proposed method with state-of-the-art at-
tack methods in the ‘universal’ setting, including TCIAA [10],
AMA [6], ODFA [7], GD-UAP [5], IR-UAP [22], M-DI2-
FGSM [27], MI-FGSM [3], and TAP [15]. The experimental
results are reported in Fig. 4. We test the transferability of
different methods in two cases: cross-CNN model and cross-
dataset. In the cross-model protocol, UAPs are trained using
ResNet50 while tested on DenseNet121. And in the cross-
dataset setting, UAPs are trained on the MSMT17 dataset
while tested on Market1501.
7TABLE I
CROSS-MODEL ATTACK RESULTS. OUR MUAP ATTACK PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITHIN THE SAME DATASET USING ‖u‖∞ ≤ 10.
mean Drop Rate Test: DukeMTMC-reID Test: Market-1501
(mDR) ResNet50 DenseNet121 VGG16 SENet154 ShuffleNet ResNet50 DenseNet121 VGG16 SENet154 ShuffleNet
ResNet50
LBase
Tr
ai
n:
D
uk
eM
T
M
C
-r
eI
D
84.38% 29.75% 38.15% 30.53% 30.96%
Tr
ai
n:
M
ar
ke
t-
15
01
89.78% 38.24% 34.91% 34.92% 60.09%
LAP 98.49% 33.61% 49.40% 21.89% 30.31% 99.39% 40.47% 46.11% 28.40% 55.11%
+LMI 92.14% 75.96% 81.51% 71.28% 71.68% 93.16 % 87.97% 92.17% 97.10% 87.04%
DenseNet121
LBase 62.93% 81.96% 52.02% 36.46% 46.11% 43.92% 83.53% 41.54% 27.87% 54.04%
LAP 89.89% 98.87% 73.15% 54.83% 71.12% 66.11% 99.36% 73.00% 32.44% 79.68%
+LMI 84.55% 96.44% 81.00% 74.58% 84.26% 84.69% 98.48% 89.37% 85.86% 86.25%
VGG16
LBase 51.41% 28.77% 89.03% 22.99% 27.9% 19.96% 17.03% 95.78% 13.52% 37.38%
LAP 65.91% 38.34% 98.93% 25.28% 35.77% 24.44% 23.17% 99.42% 14.45% 42.75%
+LMI 81.27% 82.00% 96.87% 81.15% 82.45% 86.43% 83.90% 98.89% 96.74% 89.03%
SENet154
LBase 47.49% 45.62% 55.01% 77.47% 47.49% 28.97% 26.29% 35.15% 85.69% 46.26%
LAP 76.18% 72.49% 83.32% 97.27% 74.75% 59.82% 51.33% 58.05% 98.95% 74.18%
+LMI 79.27% 78.66% 89.78% 93.60% 83.10% 81.68% 77.80% 90.93% 97.82% 86.65%
ShuffleNet
LBase 16.80% 13.22% 18.06% 14.44% 85.70% 13.48% 12.28% 13.36% 12.88% 95.52%
LAP 13.78% 11.95% 13.21% 10.33% 98.94% 24.46% 24.31% 22.20% 24.42% 99.75%
+LMI 78.30% 80.10% 84.18% 84.93% 93.44% 71.27% 74.02% 81.72% 89.18% 98.86%
TABLE II
CROSS-DATASET ATTACK RESULTS. OUR MUAP ATTACK PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ACROSS DIFFERENT DATASETS USING ‖u‖∞ ≤ 10.
mean Drop Rate Test: DukeMTMC-reID Test: Market-1501
(mDR) ResNet50 DenseNet121 VGG16 SENet154 ShuffleNet ResNet50 DenseNet121 VGG16 SENet154 ShuffleNet
Tr
ai
n:
M
SM
T
17
ResNet50
LBase 56.4% 25.25% 32.65% 25.04% 28.36% 52.34% 27.89% 33.34 % 21.24% 47.69%
LAP 70.22% 17.80% 26.05% 10.83% 36.46% 83.70% 29.57% 38.83 % 21.43% 55.67%
+LMI 83.36% 83.01% 88.12% 79.34% 67.45% 80.35% 82.93% 89.38% 85.5% 68.38%
DenseNet121
LBase 39.64% 45.33% 39.67% 19.13% 30.80% 30.62% 43.61% 32.73% 18.18% 43.66%
LAP 33.84% 34.41% 28.39% 15.05% 32.50% 34.76% 54.37% 35.65% 22.4% 49.97%
+LMI 82.37% 91.24% 89.94% 87.55% 81.67% 75.99% 92.64% 92.43% 91.21% 85.66%
VGG16
LBase 25.26% 14.20% 39.99% 10.28% 26.37% 19.23% 16.89% 57.09% 11.92% 38.13%
LAP 39.83% 20.71% 47.46% 11.01% 38.89% 23.15% 20.51% 60.06% 15.72% 45.81%
+LMI 78.50% 85.87% 89.02% 85.12% 72.32% 72.25% 81.51% 93.34% 93.06% 73.48 %
SENet154
LBase 55.86% 47.53% 59.40% 55.07% 48.92% 28.20% 25.26% 47.94% 42.21% 57.93%
LAP 70.66% 71.75% 77.83% 80.67% 67.25% 58.32% 65.24% 77.97% 88.28% 79.13%
+LMI 76.61% 76.81% 85.9% 91.35% 76.51% 73.82% 73.09% 88.63% 95.74% 79.20%
ShuffleNet
LBase 10.37% 7.25% 12.09% 6.55% 64.50% 9.23% 9.24% 12.91% 9.31% 71.03%
LAP 11.76% 6.97% 10.44% 7.41% 89.65% 12.26% 12.47% 16.33% 17.98% 97.73%
+LMI 80.35% 82.21% 89.69% 94.35% 88.09% 81.77% 80.31% 89.09% 96.42% 90.24%
Overall, the proposed method significantly outperforms
other methods in the black-box scenario (Fig. 4 (b)-(d)) and
also achieves the best performance as state of the arts in white-
box scenario (Fig. 4 (a)).
Other highlights in Fig. 4 can be summarized as follows:
• Classification-based vs. similarity-based. Most of the
methods perform well in the white-box scenario, where
similarity-based methods outperform classification-based
methods in general, e.g.ours-MUAP vs. MI-FGSM, and
ODFA vs. TAP. As can be seen, the proposed MUAP
achieves the best performance in various scenarios.
• Our proposed method outperforms all the other methods
by a large margin in black-box scenario. As shown in
(b)-(d), the performances of most methods degenerate
significantly when testing on a different CNN model
or using a different test set. However, the proposed
MUAP shows high transferability in cross-model and
cross-dataset scenarios.
B. Ablation Study
To evaluate the performance of each component of our
method, we perform extensive ablation study. In every three
rows in Tables I & II, we compare the baseline, the one with
LAP and with LAP and LMI respectively. Details are reported
in the following paragraphs.
Cross CNN architecture attack within the same dataset. We
report the mDR on DukeMTMC-reID and Market-1501 using
{γ = ∞,  = 10, λ = 10} in Table I. For every dataset, each
element in the table represents the mDR when UAP is trained
on the model of the row to attack the model of the column. The
results on the diagonal of the table marked in gray represent
performances in the white-box scenario. As can be seen, the
proposed list-wise attack (LAP ) consistently outperforms the
traditional classification-based attack method (LBase) in terms
of mDR, which validate the superiority of the proposed list-
wise attack. For example, the list-wise attack outperforms the
classification-based attack by 14.11% in terms of mDR when
trained and tested on ResNet50 on DukeMTMC-reID. The
proposed method achieves 98%+ mDR in most cases using
8LAP +LMI LAP +LMI LAP +LMI LAP +LMI LAP +LMI
(a) Avg. img. & grad. (b) VGG16 (c) ResNet50 (d) DenseNet121 (e) SENet154 (f) ShuffleNet
Fig. 5. UAPs trained with and without LMI respectively. It can be observed that there is a human body-like silhouette in the center of UAPs learned with
LMI . (a) Average images and gradients (normalized) of the training set on DukeMTMC-reID. (b)-(f) UAPs trained using different CNN architectures without
and with LMI regularizer. The pixel values are amplified (10×) for visualization.
LAP , which means that the ranking list is almost entirely
disrupted under attack. However, the transferability of UAP
to other CNN architectures is unsatisfying. For instance, the
mDR is only 12.88% when using the UAP trained on Shuf-
fleNet to attack SENet154 on Market-1501. On the other hand,
our method with model-insensitive regularization (+LMI ) sig-
nificantly improves the transferability to other CNN architec-
tures with minor performance loss under the same backbone.
Specifically, we improve the attack performance from 29.75%
to 75.96% in terms of mDR on DukeMTMC-reID when using
the UAP trained on ResNet50 to attack DenseNet121 as shown
in Table I.
Cross CNN architecture and dataset attack. In this sub-
section, we evaluate attack performance across CNN model
and datasets, which is the most challenging protocol. We
use the UAPs trained on the MSMT17 dataset to attack
the models trained on Market-1501 and DukeMTMC-reID.
The results in this scenario are reported in Table II using
{γ = ∞,  = 10, λ = 10}. The results on the diagonal of
the table marked in gray represent the performances in the
special case where the source and target models share the
same CNN architectures but with different parameters. It can
be seen that the attack can remarkably disrupt the ranking
list when the same CNN architecture is employed. However,
similar to the previous experiment, the attack performance
falls considerably when testing on a different CNN model.
An interesting phenomenon is found in ShuffleNet where the
learned UAP transfer better to different dataset than different
CNN model. The reason may reside in that ShuffleNet is
a lightweight CNN with much fewer parameters, which is
helpful to avoid overfitting. However, its special operations
such as channel shuffle are not used in other CNNs thus it
performs much worse in the cross-model case. On the other
hand, the proposed method with MI regularization increases
the attack performance significantly in most cases.
C. Exploration on polynomial UAPs
We explore the performance of polynomial UAPs in both
within-model setting and cross-model setting on Market-1501.
We adapt the polynomial UAP in our MUAP framework and
compare the performances with and without the multiplicative
term. The comparison results are reported in Table III. The
perturbation is trained on ResNet50. The hyper-parameters
including σ, β and λ are tuned to be optimal for polynomial
TABLE III
COMPARISONS OF MUAP IN THE FIRST AND SECOND-ORDER
POLYNOMIAL FORMS.
mean Drop Rate ResNet50 DenseNet121 Vgg16 SENet154 ShuffleNet(mDR)
MUAP 93.16 87.97 92.17 97.10 87.04
+PUAP 89.69 64.89 72.91 79.11 64.02
MUAP. Different from what we expected, the polynomial term
seems to harm the attack performance. The reason may be that
the multiplicative term leads to unstable magnitude fluctuation
and thus affects the optimization process.
D. Visualization
We visualize UAPs trained on different networks without
and with model-insensitive regularization in Fig. 5. The per-
turbations trained with LMI are apparently more smooth with
less fine-grained noises than those trained without LMI , and
share some similar patterns such as dots among different
models. We also find that there always is a human body-like
silhouette in the center of each perturbation trained with LMI
since minimizing LMI has the effect on pushing perturbations
into the common gradients of images. So that training UAPs
with LMI can learn the inherent structures of pedestrian
images.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper inspects the fragility of modern person Re-ID
methods against dangerous universal adversarial attacks. We
address the cross-model person Re-ID attack problem that
existing UAP attack methods usually failed. We propose a
MUAP person Re-ID attack method which is both model- and
domain-insensitive. Extensive experimental results validate the
proposed method. We show that even in the challenging cross-
model and cross-dataset attack scenario, where neither the Re-
ID model nor the training dataset is available to the attacker,
our proposed MUAP can decrease the Re-ID performance
dramatically. As a result, this study reveals that current Re-
ID systems are susceptible to MUAP attacks and thus how to
defend real-world person Re-ID systems accordingly should
be seriously considered.
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